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The Trump card in Venezuela crisis

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By Sir Ronald Sanders

When is a failed policy recognised as a failure and is abandoned for a new approach? That was the question that Barack Obama and his administration had to confront after more than 50 years of a policy of trade embargoes, sanctions and, at one point, invasion that failed to dislodge the Castro government in Cuba. It is a question that the present Donald Trump administration should be considering in relation to Venezuela and the Nicolas Maduro government.

Over the last four years, the U.S. government has imposed an array of sanctions against individuals and state enterprises in Venezuela. While the former may have hurt the individuals concerned, the latter has hurt the poorest and most vulnerable, exacerbating the flow of people from the country into neighbouring states. But, even the continuous sanctions have not created conditions in Venezuela where the people or the military have risen-up to bring about the regime change being sought by the U.S., Canada and a few countries in South and Central America.

Maduro’s government has remained in place by virtue of several circumstances, including strong support from a significant number of the population; the division among the opposition parties and the unattractiveness of their leaders, despite assertions to the contrary; and the financial backing of Russia and China, which continue to buy Venezuelan oil.

The U.S. government, Canada and a few countries in Europe have recognised Juan Guaidó as the President of Venezuela and have supported his efforts to organise protests and demonstrations, although even these have diminished in recent months. Keeping large crowds on the streets arises either out of deep commitment to a cause or considerable financial support. Protests and marches don’t pay bills unless the protestors and marchers are compensated. Money – and donors – seem to have dwindled considerably.

This latter policy of support has encouraged Guaidó not to seek genuine national solutions in the several brokered attempts at dialogue that have occurred. No party to a negotiation, assured of external backing, would make concessions that would not put it in an advantageous position. Convinced that the U.S., Canada, a few European and Latin American governments would back his hard-line positions, Guaidó didn’t bargain, he postured.

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This is not to say that the Maduro government did not also take unyielding positions. They clearly did; also encouraged by external forces, especially Russia and China, and by the fact that the majority of countries in the world still recognise it as the government of Venezuela. In the global support game, the score is Guaidó 50 or so; Maduro well over 100.

In all this, there have been no winners, only losers. And the biggest losers are the people of Venezuela whose quality of life, except for the higher echelons of the society, has dramatically deteriorated. Other losers are the neighbouring states into which Venezuelan refugees have poured. Each of them has been impacted by the inward migration. Costs of dealing with the influx of migrants has been high and has diverted funds that should be used to deliver the goods and services their own people expect. There will come a time when these same neighbouring countries will have to evaluate the damage to them of increasing and stringent sanctions on Venezuela that escalate migration. When their own circumstances compel them to do so, they will object to further sanctions and call for a reversal of many of them.

Recognising that sanctions have not produced the desired collapse of the Maduro government and that he has failed to mobilise enough internal dissent, particularly from the military, to topple the Government, Guaidó has been calling for U.S. military intervention.

A member of Guaidó’s group, Iván Simonovis, personally delivered a letter to President Donald Trump, requesting that the United States go “on the offensive”.  In a tweet, Simonovis also declared, “now we are asking to accelerate the process and cut the oxygen line, to finally end Maduro’s time”. He has repeatedly stated that the solution for Venezuela is a “military coalition”. In part, this is why the U.S. and nine countries from the Lima Group (including Guaidó’s representative), pushed through a resolution on September 11, 2019 at the Organization of American States (OAS) to invoke the terms of the Rio Treaty, an anachronistic 1947 compact.

As I have written before, the objective of the resolution, set out in an accompanying notice, was to “adopt measures” to intervene in Venezuela, which it claimed “pose a threat to peace in the Americas.”

Guaidó was a guest at President Trump’s ‘State of the Union’ address on Feb. 4, and he was received by the President at the White House for a half-hour meeting. After the meeting, Guaidó reported that “concrete measures” against Maduro would be announced in the coming days.

Much as Guaidó might want it, President Trump’s “measures” are most unlikely to include a military intervention in Venezuela. This President has shown a marked reluctance to commit the lives of American soldiers and the resources of the U.S. Treasury to fighting someone else’s war, particularly as not only would it put the U.S. in an unnecessary confrontation with Russia and China, there would not be much benefit to come from it for America. As President Trump pointed out just the day before he received Guaidó, the U.S. is entirely self-sufficient in oil and gas, and whatever top-up it needs it can get quicker and cheaper from Canada.

There is clearly a stand-off now in the Venezuelan situation. It cries out for a fresh approach. President Trump might himself be the trump card in the resolution of this situation, if he decides to use his personal authority and bargaining skills for a direct discussion with Nicolas Maduro, centred on the welfare of the Venezuelan people.

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In Other News

REQUEST FOR EXPRESSIONS OF INTEREST

(CONSULTING SERVICES – INDIVIDUAL SELECTION)

 

OECS MSME Guarantee Facility Project

Loan No.: IDA-62670, IDA-62660, IDA-62640, IBRD-88830, IDA-62650

Assignment Title: Senior Operating Officer (SOO)

Reference No. KN-ECPCGC-207852-CS-INDV

 

The Governments of Antigua and Barbuda, Commonwealth of Dominica, Grenada, St. Lucia and St. Vincent and the Grenadines have received financing in the amount of US$10 million equivalent from the World Bank towards the cost of establishing a partial credit guarantee scheme, and they intend to apply part of the proceeds to payments for goods, and consulting services to be procured under this project. 

The consultant will serve as the “Senior Operating Officer (SOO)” for the ECPCGC and should possess extensive knowledge of MSME lending with some direct experience lending to Micro, small and medium-sized businesses, knowledge of the internal control processes necessary for a lending operation and the ability to design and implement risk mitigation procedures. The ideal candidate should possess an Undergraduate Degree from a reputable college or university, preferably in Business, Accounting, Banking or related field, with a minimum of 5 years’ experience in lending, inclusive of MSME lending. The initial employment period will be for two years on a contractual basis. Renewal of the contract will be subject to a performance evaluation at the end of the contractual period. The assignment is expected to begin on September 30th, 2021.  The consultant will report directly to the Chief Executive Officer of the ECPCGC.

The detailed Terms of Reference (TOR) for the assignment can be viewed by following the attached link below. 

 

https://bit.ly/3iVannm

 

The Eastern Caribbean Partial Credit Guarantee Corporation (ECPCGC) now invites eligible “Consultants” to indicate their interest in providing the Services. Interested Consultants should provide information demonstrating that they have:

  • An Undergraduate Degree from a reputable college or university, preferably in Business, Finance, Banking or related field; and
  • Minimum of 5 years’ experience in MSME lending. Applicants should also have:
  • The ability to design and implement risk management procedures 
  • Extensive knowledge of MSME lending with some direct experience lending to small and medium-sized businesses
  • Extensive knowledge of MSME banking operations
  • Knowledge of the internal controls necessary for a lending operation and the ability to design and implement risk management procedures
  • Experience developing and presenting information in public, including responding to questions in real-time
  • Experience lending to MSMEs located in the ECCU
  • Knowledge of marketing and communicating with the MSME sector
  • Ability to draft procedures to be used in a lending operation
  • Familiarity with the mechanics of a loan guarantee program
  • Exceptional written, oral, interpersonal, and presentation skills, and
  • Proficiency in the use of Microsoft Office suite.

The attention of interested Individual Consultants is drawn to Section III, Paragraphs 3.14, 3.16, and 3.17 of the World Bank’s Procurement Regulations for IPF Borrowers July 2016, [revised November 2017] (“Procurement Regulations”), setting forth the World Bank’s policy on conflict of interest. A Consultant will be selected in accordance with the Approved Selection Method for Individual Consultants set out in the clause 7.34 of the World Bank Procurement Regulations for IPF Borrowers. 

 

Further information can be obtained at the address below during office hours 0800 to 1700 hours:

Eastern Caribbean Partial Credit Guarantee Corporation

Brid Rock, Basseterre,

St. Kitts.

Expressions of interest must be delivered in a written form by e-mail by August 11th, 2021, to [email protected]. 

 

For further information, please contact:

Carmen Gomez-Trigg                                                            Bernard Thomas

Chief Executive Officer                                                          Chief Financial Officer

Tel: 868-620-8144                                                                  Tel: 869-765-2385

Email: [email protected]                                          [email protected]